Abstract: In avionics and automotive applications of computing, special care must be taken of issues related to safety. Assurance must be provided that computer hardware or software does not contribute to situations, which may cause loss of life or significant property damage. One aspect of this concern is the design of databuses, which provide a medium to exchange information among various electronics devices in a vehicle. Unfortunately, only a few aspects of bus design have been sufficiently covered in the research studying system safety. This paper reviews and compares available information on bus specifications. Databuses are discussed regarding their properties, such as signal characteristics and bus protocols, with respect to safety.
INTRODUCTION
In avionics and automotive applications of computing special care must be taken of issues related to safety. Assurance must be provided that computer hardware or software does not contribute to situations, which may cause loss of life or significant property damage. One aspect of this concern is the design of databuses, which provide communication medium to exchange information among various electronics devices controlling the vehicle.
However, current recommendations, such as Guide to Avionics Databuses (1995) in the UK or Principles of Avionics Data Buses (1995) in the US, are a decade old and do not provide sufficient guidance on the design and usage of buses that take advantage of the latest technologies.
This paper reviews safety issues in relation to databus design and presents an overview of several databus technologies that are currently used in avionics and automotive applications.
SAFETY ASPECTS OF DATABUSES
Safety is a property of computer systems that relates to the operation of a computer in a certain physical environment. It is commonly assumed that safety can be evaluated only in the entire system, of which computer is a part. Computer hardware and software is not safe or unsafe by itself, unless it is used in certain application. Only then, one can assess how improper computer operation may inadvertently affect the external environment and potentially contribute to the loss of life, injuries, or large financial losses.
In principle, a computer or its software does not have to fail to contribute to the accident. Its operation may be perfectly well adhering to specifications, but the chain of unanticipated external events may cause the entire system (of which a computer is a part) to enter some unpredictable state, for which the computer was not designed. In this view, safety aspects of a databus have to be considered in the context of an overall risk evaluation process. This normally involves three separate aspects: hazard analysis, failure mode analysis, and safety assessment based on a set of specific criteria.
In this section, we review three above mentioned components of risk evaluation process and present some case studies, that could be used as baselines against which safety critical computer applications should be analyzed.
Aspects of Risk Analysis
Because of the risks involved in using computer equipment in safety critical applications, specific industries are highly regulated. For instance, in civil aviation in the US, several standards exist that address various aspects of airborne system certification, both for software (DO-178B) and for hardware . As a result, databuses with their hardware and software components need to be embedded into specific project and a specific vendor needs to provide appropriate data to make arguments for meeting the certification objectives.
Hazard analysis for complex automotive systems involving electronic communication devices (such as databuses) has been done recently by Debouk et el. (2003) . They present a list of potential hazards that need to be taken into account at the beginning of safety analysis of X-by-wire systems, consisting of steer-by-wire, brake-by-wire, electronic throttle, and active safety systems. They divide associated risks according to critical, moderate and low consequences. Table 1 includes the hazards with highest associated risk and their possible controls. Chau et al. (2001) describe and discuss typical failure modes for a highly reliable bus architecture for space applications. Their study is related to the use of commercial-off-the-shelf products, such as those compliant with IEEE Std 1394 and SpaceWire, to be used in high availability avionics systems. They identified those failure modes that are fairly frequent or critical to the survival of the spacecraft. A summary of the discussion is presented in Table 2 below. 
Automotive and Avionics Case Studies
The theoretical and engineering methodologies and tools, such as those described in previous section, have to be applied to practical cases before any credible safety assessment of a databus design can be made. Below, we briefly present two case studies taken from the available literature, to illustrate the level of complexity any safety analysis of the databus design has to deal with.
Waern (2003) studied a system for steer-by-wire application, as an example of X-by-wire system, illustrated in Fig. 1 . All its individual components are connected electronically via a databus and include an array of sensors (steering wheel sensors, wheel angle sensors, environment sensors, etc.) and respective actuators (steering actuators, driver feedback actuators, etc.). All X-by-wire systems, where X stands for brake, steer, shift, throttle, etc., are extremely demanding, since their functions are extremely critical for safety. Similar case studies have been presented in the literature for aircraft. Yeh (1998) analyzes a flight control system, fly-by-wire, for controlling flying surfaces of Boeing 777 commercial aircraft (Fig. 2) . Around a dozen of ARINC 629 buses glue together multiple systems consisting of sensors, transducers, actuators, alerts and warnings, electrical and hydraulic power control, information management system, interfaces and other digital electronics. For this system, a comprehensive safety analysis was performed to assess all potential, significant failures of the fly-by-wire system, including single failures, latent failures, and failure combinations. In the analysis, system separation, partitioning and redundancy were addressed in particular,
DATABUS DESIGNS
Case studies presented above, as well as others described in the literature (steer-by-wire, Wilvert et al. 2003 ; safe-by-wire system, Boys 2004; car entertainment platform, Lessard 2003), give a broader context for studying databus design with respect to safety. There are essentially three types of applications that require the use of buses on vehicles: -entertainment -traditional, under the hood, and -safety related. For each of those categories different databus solutions have been proposed and developed. In this study, we concentrate on databuses designed for safety related applications, giving only a limited consideration to other kinds of buses.
Essential characteristics of databus description from the safety standpoint do not differ much from conventional bus specifications, which must include mechanical, electrical and logical elements of the bus design (Zalewski 1995):
-mechanical properties concern bus wiring, connectors, pinout, module design and dimensions, -electrical (or optical) properties are related to signal levels and their dynamics to carry information, including electromagnetic characteristics, and -logical properties concern the protocol of exchanging information over a bus.
Specifics of the bus protocol must include separate descriptions of the three phases of bus operation:
-bus arbitration (competing for bus access) -data transfer, how devices exchange data once they obtain bus access, and -fault handling (dealing with bus errors). Bus protocols are typically described in terms of a layered approach, defining various aspects of bus operation according to the respective layers of the ISO/OSI Reference Model, especially Physical, Data Link and Application layers.
Some, but not all of these elements, have been included in databus comparisons published thus far in the literature. Our purpose in this paper is not so much to compare existing bus technologies, but to review them with respect to specific characteristics important for safety. In the following sections we are addressing the most important aspects of respective databus designs. Due to a limited space, we only focus on selected issues.
Traditional Avionics Databuses
This is the oldest category of databuses, well documented and researched, with a multitude of applications worldwide, on both military and civilian aircraft (Newport 1995 
CAN and TT-CAN (Leteinturier 2003)
World standard in automotive electronic control, wide component manufacturing and support bases; typical application involves 2-10 control units with soft real-time requirements: o data rate: 10 kb/s to 1 Mb/s o type: serial, bi-directional, multi-master o medium: differential twisted pair, single wire, optical fiber o bit encoding: NRZ with bit stuffing, 5V/50mA transceivers o architecture: multi-master bus, bitwise priority arbitration, event-triggered with no clock synchronization, multicast transmission with message filtering o protocol: Physical Layer + Data Link Layer (Logical Link Control + Media Access Control = Object + Transfer Layers) o frame length: varies by frame type, for data 107-bit (max. 64 data bits, 11 bits address id, 15 bit CRC, 6 bit control field) o frame types: data, remote, overload, error o max length: 40 m for 1 Mb/s, 100 m for 500 kb/s, 200 m for 250 kb/s, 500 m for 125 kb/s, 6 km for 10 kb/s; max 2048 nodes theoretically for CAN 2.0A -average nodes: 2-10 nodes per network o fault tolerant features: (a) frame recognition determined by polarity of the RTR bit, data and remote frames separated by interframe spacing; (b) error detection: stuff, bit timing, data, 15 bit CRC, format and message acknowledgement error detection o bus highlights: immediate message retransmission, low message latency for small traffic loads, wide support network of manufactures and suppliers, highly tested.
TT-CAN -adds session layer on top of CAN, uses TDMA as medium access protocol, disables retransmission and provides global clock synchronization via master reference message, with 1-8B of data per frame. Bus highlights include: support for deterministic messages and fault handling, low jitter transmission, 25-35% typical data efficiency, error detection and redundancy management; improved bus utilization for higher traffic loads as compared to CAN. Maier et al. 2002) Designed for avionic flight control (Airbus) 
TTP/C (

Others
There is a multitude of other databuses used in avionics and automotive applications, but due to a limited space it is impossible to describe them all. Only some of them can be mentioned here: -ROBUS (Reliable Optical BUS) is a fault tolerant bus being developed at NASA as a part of a SPIDER project for high-reliability space missions (Miner et al. 2002) -SpaceWire is a serial, point-to-point, full-duplex bus based on IEEE Std 1355, modified for space applications, with minimum data rate of 2 Mb/s (no maximum), and predetermined jitter (Chau et al. 2001) -Byteflight has been designed by BMW to support both event and time driven messaging in passive safety systems; it has been essentially incorporated into FlexRay's dynamic protocol segment (Homer 2002) -Bluetooth and its derivative, ZigBee, are wireless short-range (< 100 m) networks that may play an important role in the future, because of their natural built-in ability of quick reconfiguration (Trawczynski 2005).
CONCLUSION
There is no single databus that could be selected as the best for safety related applications. When a decision is to be made, which bus to use, safety related factors have to be considered involving hazard analysis and failure mode analysis to estimate risks for a specific bus design.
Buses and protocols like FlexRay, TTP/C etc., that have been designed specifically to provide high level of fault tolerance may become the best solution but at higher cost. Therefore a tradeoff analysis has to be also done. Further work is ongoing on a more detailed bus comparison by using simulation and fault injection.
